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Abstract We develop a dynamic discrete choice model of an unchecked ruler making de-
cisions regarding the development of a resource rich country. Resources serve as collateral
and facilitate the acquisition of loans. The ruler chooses either to stay in power while facing
the risk of being ousted, or loot the country’s riches by liquefying the resources through
lending. We show that unstructured lending from international credit markets can create in-
centives to loot the country; and an enhanced likelihood of looting causes greater political
instability, and diminishes growth. Using a treatment effects model, we find evidence that
supports our predictions.
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so their assets always exceed their liabilities, which is the technical reason for bank-
ruptcy. And that’s very different from a company.” Walter Wriston (Citicorp Chairman,
1970–1984)
1 Introduction
An extensive literature documents that resource wealth can be a curse rather than a blessing
for many countries (Sachs and Warner 1995). There are at least three different explanations
for this so-called resource curse. Reduced growth in resource-rich countries has been asso-
ciated with (i) increased indebtedness (Manzano and Rigobon 2001), (ii) domestic conflict
and political instability (Collier and Hoeffler 2004), and with (iii) autocratic regimes and
poor institutions (Ross 2001; Isham et al. 2005). Clearly there are political and institutional
dimensions to resource-related development problems that need to be unraveled.
This paper contributes to that ambitious objective, by combining institutional and eco-
nomic factors in modeling resource-rich economies. It commences from the observation that
many resource-rich countries hold these resources as national assets (rather than under sys-
tems of private property rights) and thus present a situation where the ruling party or person
finds itself immediately endowed with substantial rights to the state’s resource wealth upon
taking political control. Where such control is relatively unchecked, this presents the new
rulers of such states with an immediate decision regarding the exploitation of its political
position. Should political control be converted into immediately available wealth, or should
it be retained to generate some other positive payoffs for the leadership in the future? This is
akin to the voluntary liquidation—or “looting”—option first modeled by Akerlof and Romer
(1994) and discussed in the context of African economies by Bates (2008).
Autocratic leaders who stay and invest in the development of such countries must first
make the decision not to engage in immediate looting (see also Overland et al. 2005). When
the incentives to stay and invest are inadequate, centralized autocratic regimes translate con-
trol into little other than a series of looting incidents. Thus it is the incentives for looting
(rather than investing) that turn resource-richness into economic disaster. States evidencing
long-standing looting behavior include countries such as Nigeria or the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo (DRC), in which the disastrous economic and political performance can be
easily traced to the ongoing predatory behavior of a series of autocratic regimes. Many eco-
nomic and political studies list examples of such resource-inspired looting-type behavior
(e.g., Jayachandran and Kremer 2006; Bates 2008).
We are not the first to point to the importance of institutions in the explanation of
the resource curse. There is plenty of evidence suggesting that institutional quality is
one of the main drivers of economic development in general (Acemoglu et al. 2001;
Rodrik et al. 2004), and it has been argued that the fates of resource-rich economies
in particular are influenced by the quality of their institutions (Robinson et al. 2006;
Mehlum et al. 2006). Our point is more specific. We argue that it can be a particular
sort of interaction between domestic institutional weaknesses (centralized governance and
unchecked autocratic decision making) and international institutional weaknesses (unstruc-
tured lending conditions) that might explain looting behavior and provide a better under-
standing of the resource curse. Specifically we demonstrate here that there is one set of
institutional failures that can combine to create irresistible incentives for the looting of na-
tions. These are: a) the existence of relatively undeveloped domestic democratic institutions
(an absence of checks on the current ruler); b) the presence of nationally held resource rights
(centralized economies); and c) the availability of relatively unstructured international lend-
ing by banks to such rulers (unconditional conferment of liquidity).
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Fig. 1 Evolution of average
lending and resource rent
(% GDP)
As indicated above, the international capital market plays a crucial role in our story. We
wish to examine in particular how excessive resource-based lending by external financial
institutions can induce debt, default and regime change in developing countries. This sort
of moral hazard in the financial markets leading to excessive lending to sovereigns has been
noted previously (Bulow 2002).1 A casual look at the data confirms some basic findings
highlighted in the literature. Figure 1 shows the evolution of average lending and resource
rents between 1970 and 2000. The lending curve mirrors the resource rents curve. This
supports earlier claims that international financial markets lend money during commodity
“booms” and restrict liquidity during “busts”. The evolution of these two indicators is in-
dicative of the “boom-based borrowing capacity” highlighted by Usui (1997), and Manzano
and Rigobon (2001). We also are not the first to highlight the roles of international lending
and indebtedness in reduced growth. Manzano and Rigobon (2001) find that the resource
curse vanishes when controlling for indebtedness. Their argument is that large credits of-
fered on resource-based collateral in periods of commodity boom resulted in substantial
debt overhang when commodity prices fell in the 1980’s.2
We agree with their analysis, and develop ours to elaborate and expound upon the mecha-
nisms by which resource-based lending goes bad. The most fundamental cause of this prob-
lem is moral hazard: the international creditors, private and official, perceive no downside
risk to lending on the basis of resource-based collateral. This is because lenders see little
reason to exercise restraint in lending to resource-rich states, since the resources (and liabil-
ities) remain behind even when the regime changes (see introductory quote above) (Bulow
2002). This means that lenders have little reason to be concerned about the incentives their
loans generate. According to Raffer and Singer (2001: 161), the policy of “liberal lending
by commercial banks opened a bonanza for corrupt regimes. After amassing huge debts and
filling their pockets, military juntas (. . .) simply handed power and the debt problem over to
1The existence of “excessive resource-based lending” is reinforced by the observation that 12 of the world’s
most mineral-dependent countries and six of the world’s most oil-dependent countries are currently classified
as highly indebted poor countries (Weinthal and Luong 2006).
2In the 1970s and early 1980s international banks (such as Citicorp and Chase Manhattan) lent vast amounts
of money to developing nations based on their natural resources endowment, virtually irrespective of their
long-run ability to repay such debts (Sampson 1982). It is now seen that the boom in resource prices in the
1970s increased the value of in situ resources, aiding the ability of resource-rich economies to attract foreign
loans and run up debts. The absence of productive investment by these resource-rich nations meant that there
was significant indebtedness with little demonstratively positive impact upon growth.
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civilians.” We demonstrate in our model precisely how such unstructured lending generates
the incentives for the combined events of debt and departure, instability and indebtedness.
In sum, we develop a model of a resource-rich economy governed by a self-interested
ruler with unchecked property rights in national resources who cares only about his own
consumption. The crucial and discrete choice made by the ruler is whether to stay and in-
vest, or to loot and exit. In spirit, the model is close to Overland et al. (2005) who explore
the determinants of a dictator’s decision to initiate growth or “plunder his country” when
he faces a potentially insecure tenure. This is reminiscent of McGuire and Olson’s (1996)
bandit model in which when an autocrat is secure about his tenure, he will stop behav-
ing as a “roving bandit” leader and instead act as a ruler (or “stationary bandit”) whose
interest is aligned with the people’s. However, our model differs because our focus is on
the role of financial markets in liquefying sunk capital, especially in regard to natural re-
sources. To the extent that external finance facilitates the conversion of sunk capital into
liquid capital—enabling the leader to make immediate access to wealth that usually requires
time and investment—it affects the tradeoff between staying (re-investing in the economy
and consuming by maintaining control) or looting (taking the extant liquidity and exiting).
This combination of resource wealth and excessive external lending gives rise over time to
endogenous political instability, lack of investment and indebtedness.
Our main results are as follows. We first demonstrate in a simple model how a dictator
taking control of a nation’s resources might decide between three distinctly different paths:
(1) immediate looting of the country’s resource wealth; (2) transitory investment in the coun-
try’s capital base to build up additional liquidity for looting in the medium term; or (3) long
term investment in the economy (and possibly in shared consumption or political repression)
in an attempt to secure tenure and to consume from the economy. Second, we demonstrate
the main factors affecting the dictator’s choice between these various paths, being: a) the
level of external finance available for liquefying resource wealth; b) the indebtedness of
the economy; and finally c) the productivity of investments within the economy. After dis-
cussing the dictator’s problem, we provide simulations of the path of such an economy over
time which, under specific conditions (low productivity and high liquidity), is one of recur-
rent looting—resulting in political instability, low growth and substantial indebtedness. We
demonstrate that the same autocrats (with lower liquidity or higher security) will pursue a
path of optimal investment and high growth—acting more as an owner and less as a looter
of the economy. Finally, we provide empirical evidence that corroborates the predictions
from our theoretical framework. We find that greater lending to sufficiently resource-rich
countries is associated with enhanced likelihood of political turnover—an empirical proxy
for looting—which in turn is negatively associated with economic growth. Indeed, the effect
of a one standard deviation increase in lending results in an expected decrease in economic
growth ranging from 0.47 to 0.72 percentage points. This finding suggests that the model
points to a channel through which the resource curse may arise.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we present a stylized model of the looting
of a resource-rich nation with an unchecked ruler who has access to foreign lending. In
Sect. 3, we simulate the choices of a series of such autocrats over time, and demonstrate
the economic outcomes for the nation over a significant range of parameters. In Sect. 4, we
initiate our empirical analysis of resource-rich states, outlining our empirical strategy and
introducing our data. In Sect. 5, we present regression results—looking at the relationship
in these states between: a) lending and looting; and b) political instability and economic
growth. Section 6 concludes.
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2 A stylized model of looting
Here we discuss a model based on Akerlof and Romer (1994) in which we investigate the
effects of natural resource abundance, poor governance and unsound lending on political
stability and ultimately on economic performance. Poor governance is present in the form
of an unchecked ruler with implicit property rights in the resources of the state. We are
interested in how such an autocrat will elect to achieve a payout on these property rights and,
in particular, the impact of lending market imperfections upon the dictator’s choice between
staying and looting. Staying involves the dictator’s commitment to acquiring a return by
holding onto power and investing in the country. Looting involves electing a short term “hit
and run” strategy of maximum loan, minimal investment, and immediate departure. Before
we examine the model, we will first define the primary actors existing within the framework.
2.1 Autocratic resource-rich states
The states concerned hold their fixed natural resource stocks directly as sovereign assets;
there are no intermediate entities (corporations, individuals) holding rights to these re-
sources. Once in power, the leader of the state has the unchecked authority to mine the
resources or to enter into contracts on behalf of the state in regard to the natural resource
assets. These natural resources are sunk assets, but are assumed to be capable of provid-
ing a constant stream of revenues into the indefinite future. Consider such an autocratic
resource-rich state, a small open economy producing output yt according to the function
yt = f (kt ) + ϕ(Z), where f and ϕ are two increasing, concave, and continuously differ-
entiable functions of capital kt and Z. ϕ(Z) is the flow of resource rents deriving from the
state’s sunk resource wealth Z. We will assume here that the flow of rents from resources
remains constant throughout the program, while the productivity of the economy may be
enhanced by means of investment in capital. The capital stock kt evolves according to the
transition equation kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + it , where it and δ represent the current gross invest-
ment and the depreciation rate. Because of the natural resource endowment, this country
qualifies for loans lt from international commercial banks at the beginning of each period
so that it faces the following budget constraint: ct + it + rdt = yt + lt , where r is the inter-
est rate paid on accumulated debt, dt . The country’s stock of debt evolves according to the
following transition equation:
dt+1 = dt + lt
The interest on the debt must be paid each period for the banks to accept lending in the next
period. So, the cost of servicing the debt rdt is incurred each period that the state is not in
default.
2.2 External financial institutions
Foreign financial institutions make liquidity available to the resource-rich states in recogni-
tion of the expected future flows of value from the resource base. These institutions (primar-
ily the commercial banking sector) recognize the authority of rulers of autocratic resource-
rich states to enter into contracts on behalf of the states in regard to these resources, and any
contracts entered into by a ruler continue as obligations of that state beyond the individual
tenure of that ruler. The commercial banking sector offers liquidity to the current leader con-
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tingent upon the state not currently being in default.3 The amount of liquidity is constrained
by an aggregate debt ceiling proportionate to the total resources available.
We are assuming here that international lenders are relying primarily on the anticipated
flows from natural resource stocks as implicit collateral for their loans. Natural resources
(more specifically the so-called “point source” resources such as oil and minerals) differ
from other forms of capital such as physical infrastructure, hospitals, schools or factories in
that they can be more readily liquefied by means of bank lending. We capture this notion
by assuming that the liquidity parameter θz for the natural resource is larger than for other
forms of capital, θk , i.e., θz > θk ≥ 0.
Banks recognize that adverse selection can result from price-based lending and so limit
lending levels instead (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Credit rationing here is limited by both
the immediate and discounted future flows from the resource base available for repayment
(Bulow and Rogoff 1989). This means that, so long as the state is not in default (i.e., prior
debt is serviced), the lenders are willing to provide a maximum loan amount in any given
period in proportion to the total amount of longer term resources available. The first point
indicates that there is a certain proportion of resource-based capital and physical capital that
is liquefiable in any given period, i.e., θzZ + θkkt . This implies that:
lt ≤ θzZ + θkkt (1)
The second point captures the idea of a credit ceiling (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981). We as-
sume that the aggregate debt level is limited to the amount serviceable by the present value
of the stream of liquidity derivable from all capital stocks.
dt+1 ≤ (1 + r)
r
(θzZ + θkkt ) (2)
2.3 The dictator
The ruler of the state concerned is a dictator in that he has unchecked power over the re-
source wealth and other assets of the state for the duration of his tenure. His problem is
to determine how best to appropriate maximum utility from his period of tenure over these
resources. These resources are sunk, in that there is only a fixed proportion of the resources
realizable in any given period of his tenure. These flows may then be consumed immediately
or invested in the productive capacity of the economy which makes them available for future
consumption. The ruler can affect the length of his tenure by means of investments in so-
cietal betterment (shared consumption) or repression but there remains uncertainty in each
period concerning whether the regime will end at that time. With international lending, the
ruler has the option of liquefying some additional proportion of the state’s resource wealth
in any given period, at the cost of an increase in the state’s debt at the beginning of the next
period.
2.4 The dictator’s problem
These three assumptions are sufficient for establishing the structure of our autocrat’s choice
problem, which is built upon the premise that the ruler is pursuing his own agenda after
assuming control of the state (Acemoglu et al. 2004).
3Default is a suspension of payments of interest or principal that can end when a creditor and the debtor agree
to a new schedule for repayment of some proportion of interest in arrears and principal outstanding.
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In each period, the incumbent dictator decides whether to stay in power or to loot the
country and leave immediately. His choice resembles that of the manager of a firm who
selects strategically the point in time of the liquidation of a limited liability corporation
(Mason and Swanson 1996). The basic decision comes down to whether to abscond with
maximum liquidity today, or whether to stay and invest in tenure and productivity in order
acquire a return from holding control over the productive capacities of the enterprise in the
future.
If the dictator decides to stay, he captures part of the benefits from production, and then
faces the decision regarding looting again in the next period. By staying, the dictator faces
the possibility that he will be ousted, and lose everything along with his loss of control. The
decision whether to stay one more period or to loot is a recursive discrete choice problem
described by the following equation:
V (kt , dt , εt ) = max
χt∈{stay,loot}
[
vχ(kt , dt ) + εt (χt )
] (3)
This equation relies on the assumption of additive separability (AS) of the utility function
between observed and unobserved state variables. We will also assume that 1) εt follows
an extreme value distribution; and 2) εt+1 and εt are independent conditional on the ob-
served state variables kt and dt . These assumptions follow Rust (1987 and 1994) and greatly
simplify this complex problem.
2.5 The decision to retain control
Given a decision to stay and maintain control, the dictator will choose current period con-
sumption ct , capital level kt+1, debt level dt+1 and repression level st to secure his rule. He
enjoys an instantaneous utility u(ct ) where u > 0, u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0, and an expected stream
of future utilities should he remain in power. He decides the investment level in productive
capital each period by choosing kt+1 according to the following law of motion:
kt+1 = f (kt ) + ϕ(Z) + (1 − δ)kt − ct − rdt + lt − cost(st ) (4)
where st measures the repression level chosen by the dictator (e.g., expenditures on secret
services, police and army), and whose associated costs are represented by cost(st ).
2.6 The risk from retaining control
Within each period t , the dictator experiences the realization of a discrete random variable
ξt = {0,1}, where ξt = 1 indicates that the dictator is toppled, and ξt = 0 indicates that the
dictator remains in power. We assume that the realization of the shock depends both on the
choice of next period’s capital stock and repression level. This specification captures the idea
that both consumption-sharing and military-spending are strategies for maintaining control
over the economy. Let ρ(kt+1, st ) = ρ(ξt = 1 | kt+1, st ) denote the probability of the dictator
being deposed next period given that he was in power this period; ρ(kt+1, st ) is assumed
to be strictly decreasing and strictly convex in both arguments—see Overland et al. (2005)
for a similar idea. That is, increased kt+1 and st decrease the probability of being toppled
at a decreasing rate. The idea here is that the dictator may invest in repression to secure his
tenure and may also attempt to buy peace by sharing some of the output with the population
(kt+1). This dilemma has also been analyzed by Azam (1995).
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2.7 The optimal length of tenure
The fundamental tradeoff from the perspective of the dictator concerns the refusal of
amounts currently appropriable from the economy (via liquidity and looting) in pursuit
of the amounts potentially producible in future periods (via investment and retention of
tenure). The optimal tenure of a dictator is more than one period, only if there is suffi-
cient security and expectation of returns to render investment the preferred option. This
points to the fact that almost any resource-rich country can be encouraged toward default
by affording sufficient levels of liquidity. This has been demonstrated by others, in their in-
quiries into the nature of self-enforcing sovereign debt contracts (Bulow and Rogoff 1989;
Kletzer and Wright 2000). Our paper is a counter-part to those, illustrating how an inef-
ficient sovereign debt contract is capable of inducing political instability and default, and
demonstrating what is “excessive” liquidity in the context of a resource-rich but autocratic
state. In the next section we give a simulation of this model for purposes of demonstrating
how liquidity is able to induce instability and hence underinvestment and lack of growth.
3 Simulation of the model—liquidity and the looting economy
The previous section set out the basic choice of an autocratic ruler of a resource rich state
between “staying and investing” or “liquidating and looting”. In this section we demonstrate
how the offer of resource-based liquidity provides an incentive system for the dictator, de-
termining whether he will choose to loot, or invest in, the economy. Our basic point here is
that the returns from investment in the economy must decline over some range, while the re-
turns from looting remain constant. For this reason, the system of incentives for looting will
evolve with the state of the economy, and given the particular level of liquidity available.
The incentives to loot or to invest are determined by: a) the rate of return on investment;
b) the security of the autocrat; and c) the level of liquidity on offer.
In this section we simulate the growth and development of such an autocratic resource-
rich economy, given both low liquidity and high liquidity, in order to illustrate how a dictator
will choose its date of departure by reference to the evolving system of incentives to loot.
Initially the dictator will perceive high returns to initial investments in capital, and so stay
and invest, but as successive increments to the capital stock reduce returns, the relative
returns to looting may come to dominate.
3.1 Specification of the growth model
To illustrate the dynamics of a resource-rich economy with optional liquidity-based looting,
we simulate the model using the following functional forms: utility is specified as a CES
function u(c) = c1−σ1−σ , and the probability of losing power is an exponential function of the
form ρ(k′) = exp(−λk′), where λ represents the dictator’s effectiveness in preventing his
demise. The production function takes the form f (k) = Ys − Ys1+k , where f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0.
In the limit, output will tend to Ys . The value of staying and looting are then given by:4
vstay(k, d) = max
c,k′,d ′∈(k,d)
(1 − exp(−λk′))
[
c1−σ
1 − σ + βEε′V (k
′, d ′)
]
(5)
4For the sake of simplicity, we omit the role of repression s in the simulation.
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s.t. (k, d) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
k′ = f (k) + Zϕ + (1 − δ)k − c − (1 + r)d + d ′
d ′ = d + l
d ′ ≤ (1+r)
r
(θzZ + θkk)
l ≤ θzZ + θkk
c ≥ 0;
k ≥ 0; d ≥ 0
k(0) = k0; d(0) = d0
(6)
vloot(k, d) = u(c
loot)
1 − β where c
loot = r
1 + r (θzZ + θkk) (7)
The following parameters are established as baselines, and will remain constant throughout
all of the simulations: β = 0.95; σ = 0.9; δ = 0.1; r = 0.12.
3.2 Simulation of growth
In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 we illustrate the impact of incentives for looting generated by first
low liquidity and then high liquidity in resource-based lending. Figure 2 demonstrates the
existence of investment incentives for small enough values of θz. Here the dictator views
the productivity of the economy as his primary asset. Debt is exercised to its limit, but the
dictator uses it for investment and in-place consumption. The regime does not change and
capital levels reach the steady state optimum. In effect, the autocrat is acting as “owner”
or “stationary bandit” of the entire economy, and lending simply serves its purpose as a
mechanism for shifting consumption across time. However, when θz is high enough (doubled
to 0.6Z as in Fig. 3), the dictator uses debt to pursue a “hit and run” strategy with regard
to the economy. He accumulates capital to a point, but then loots as much of the capital
and liquidity as is possible. This decision to loot is based on the dictator’s comparison of
the relative returns to further capital investments versus liquidity-based looting, which flip
the incentives for the autocrat in the third period. This change in incentives for the dictator
makes a big difference for the economy concerned. A comparison of the two simulations
reveals that capital in the looted economy moves to levels approximately 15% below that
which occurs under the investment scenario (comparing Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 at period 3).
More importantly, the dynamics of the simulation reveal that the second economy never
recovers from this initial looting. The fact that the new dictator (in period 4) takes over
an economy with higher debt levels means that the value of staying commences at a much
reduced level. Looting becomes the optimal choice for this economy from then on. A series
of incoming autocrats immediately loot the country’s riches until debt reaches the ceiling,
at which point banks are no longer willing to provide further liquidity (see Fig. 3 in periods
4–13). This economy is now caught in a “debt trap” of political instability and low growth,
with its origins in the level of resource-based liquidity proffered to the incoming autocrats.
These simulations demonstrate that an incoming autocrat may act as an “owner” or as a
“thief” in regard to the economy, depending upon the level of liquidity on offer. Low levels
of liquidity maintain the incentives to stay and to invest as the owner of the economy. The
returns from control are secured by staying on the scene, maintaining control and securing
the flow of returns from earlier investments. On the other hand, high levels of liquidity act as
a prize to the winner of the contest for control, and create incentives for an ongoing system
of hits and runs. The returns from control in this case are secured simply by winning the
contest for control of the economy—then the banks pay the prize and the contest winner
exits the stage. This may be illustrated by comparing the incentives of a relatively secure
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Period Capital Output Debt Consumption Number
Regimes
1 7.4 11.5 1.5 0.9 1
2 23.3 12.5 6.0 13.0 1
3 26.0 12.5 10.6 14.9 1
4 26.0 12.5 15.1 14.3 1
5 26.0 12.5 19.6 13.8 1
6 26.0 12.5 24.2 13.3 1
7 26.0 12.5 28.7 12.7 1
8 26.0 12.5 33.2 11.9 1
9 26.0 12.5 37.0 7.7 1
10 26.0 12.5 37.0 7.7 1
11 26.0 12.5 37.0 7.7 1
12 26.0 12.5 37.0 7.7 1
13 26.0 12.5 37.0 7.7 1
14 26.0 12.5 37.0 7.7 1
15 26.0 12.5 37.0 7.7 1
β = 0.95; σ = 0.9; r = 0.12; δ = 0.1; θz = 0.3; θk = 0.1; λ = 0.15; ϕ = 0.5; NR = 5; Ys = 13; dmax = 37
Fig. 2 Optimal capital over time with low θz
dictator (low hazard of displacement) in Fig. 2 with those obtaining under the conditions of
an insecure ruler (high hazard rate) in Fig. 4. What is the impact of “security of tenure” on
the incentive system facing the dictator?5 If the dictator is able to secure his tenure (relatively
high λ in Fig. 2) then he has incentives to stay and invest in productive capital as “owner”.
By contrast, if he is unable to secure his tenure (low λ in Fig. 4), then the incentives are
to loot. Since insecurity and lending have the same impact on incentives, it is apparent that
both have the capacity to turn an owner-ruler into a thief.
These simulations translate our basic model of autocratic choice into empirically ob-
servable outcomes regarding lending, political instability, and economic growth. We have
demonstrated that excessive resource-based lending may be seen to induce political insta-
bility and result in poorly performing economies. We turn now to an empirical examination
of these claims.
5Comparing Figs. 2 and 4 demonstrates the point of McGuire and Olson (1996). When the probability of
survival is high and the autocrat values the future, an “invisible hand” makes his interest consistent with the
interests of society at large.
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Period Capital Output Debt Consumption VLoot Number
Regimes
1 7.4 11.5 2.3 1.2 1
2 24.9 12.5 9.1 16.1 1
3 22.4 12.4 14.1 184.8 1
4 20.2 12.4 19.1 183.8 2
5 18.2 12.3 24.1 182.9 3
6 16.4 12.3 29.1 182.0 4
7 14.7 12.2 34.1 181.2 5
8 13.3 12.1 38.1 180.4 6
9 11.9 12.0 42.1 179.7 7
10 10.7 11.9 46.1 179.0 8
11 9.7 11.8 50.1 178.3 9
12 8.7 11.7 54.1 177.7 10
13 7.8 11.5 56.0 177.2 11
β = 0.95; σ = 0.9; r = 0.12; δ = 0.1; θz = 0.6; θk = 0.1; λ = 0.15; ϕ = 0.5; NR = 5; Ys = 13; dmax = 56
Fig. 3 Optimal capital over time with high θz
4 Empirical model and data
The key prediction from our theoretical model is that unstructured lending into a country
with resources heightens the incentive to loot and under-invest in the economy. This leads
to slow economic growth.6
We will test our theory of liquidity-induced looting against the Dutch Disease alternative.
The claims to be investigated are as follows:
Claim 1 Greater lending at a fixed level of natural resource wealth makes the probability of
looting more likely. The impact is magnified as resource wealth increases.
Claim 2 The political instability associated with looting will adversely affect economic
growth in an autocratic resource-rich state.
6The relevant baseline comparison is to a dictator who has sufficiently low levels of resource collateral so that
unstructured lending is minimal. It could also be to an infinitely lived representative consumer/producer who
does not face political uncertainty and who cannot borrow in the same unstructured fashion that the dictator
can.
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Period Capital Output Debt Consumption ConsoLoot VLoot Number
Regimes
1 7.4 11.5 1.5 0.85 1
2 6.7 11.3 3.5 0.18 168.37 1
3 6.0 11.1 5.5 0.17 167.68 2
4 5.4 11.0 7.5 0.17 167.04 3
5 4.9 10.8 9.5 0.16 166.44 4
6 4.4 10.6 11.5 0.15 165.89 5
7 3.9 10.4 13.5 0.15 165.38 6
8 3.6 10.1 15.5 0.15 164.90 7
9 3.2 9.9 17.5 0.14 164.47 8
10 2.9 9.6 19.5 0.14 164.06 9
11 2.6 9.4 21.5 0.13 163.69 10
12 2.3 9.1 23.5 0.13 163.35 11
13 2.1 8.8 25.5 0.13 163.04 12
14 1.9 8.5 27.5 0.13 162.76 13
15 1.7 8.2 29.5 0.13 162.50 14
β = 0.95; σ = 0.9; r = 0.12; δ = 0.1; θz = 0.3; θk = 0.1; λ = 0.13; ϕ = 0.5; NR = 5; Ys = 13; dmax = 37
Fig. 4 Optimal capital over time with high hazard (low λ)
These claims follow from the implied logic of our model.7 These claims are tested against
a more conventional Dutch Disease hypothesis. This alternative implies that increased re-
source reliance leads directly to slower growth by making industrial activity less lucrative.
In a related vein, another alternative hypothesis is that resource rents are grabbed when
poor institutions reign (Mehlum et al. 2006). Grabbing diverts resources from other more
productive pursuits, but this alternative is implicit in our tests. We restrict attention to autoc-
racies which tend to have poor institutional quality. The financial channel that determines the
level of looting is the focus of our paper. This complements previous research on grabbing.
7One subsidiary claim is that greater lending at fixed levels of the capital stock (higher θk ) makes looting
more likely. We do not have good measures of the capital stock and interacting a lending variable with GDP
per capita is problematic given that GDP depends, among other things, on resource endowments. We assume
therefore that this part of the lending and looting decision is orthogonal to the resource lending we see and
control only for lending relative to the resource stock.
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It has also been argued that natural resource abundance creates civil conflict and costly
battles over resource rents; we control for the level of civil unrest and disorder so as to com-
pare countries with similar levels of conflict. The question is whether the financial channel
adds any explanatory power to regime turnover. Thus we look both at the empirical impli-
cations of our model versus others for political instability and also economic growth.8
To test our claims, we use a sample of 44 autocracies between 1972 and 1999. These
are listed in Table 1. Data on lending, political and economic performance, natural resource
wealth and other control variables are included from various sources described below.
We specify two estimating equations. One is for annual changes in economic growth
following Londregan and Poole (1990) and Alesina et al. (1996) who studied political in-
stability and growth. The other is a latent variable model of looting. Looting is inherently
unobservable. Our model suggests that if enough looting occurs a regime could be toppled
(e.g., due to low investment and popular dissatisfaction with slow growth) or, alternatively,
a leader that loots would choose to depart in order to consume the fruits of his malfeasance.
We proxy this looting with a binary variable that takes the value one if there is an irregular
political change in regime.9 The two equations of interest are:
 log(GDPcap)it = α0 + α1Lootit + α2Rentit−1 + α3X1it + uit (8)
Lootit =
{
1 if Loot∗it > 0
0 otherwise
Loot∗it = Witβ = β0 + β1NRStockit + β2Lendingit
+ β3(NRStockit × Lendingit ) + β4NRStock2it
+ β5 log(GDPcap)it−1 + β6 log(GDPcap)2it−1
+ β7 DebtitGDPit + W1itβ8 + ηit
(9)
where NRStock and Rent denote, respectively, the ratio of the resource stock and the resource
rent over GDP.
We estimate (8) and (9) jointly by Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) using
a treatment regression approach. This allows for correlation between the two error terms u
and η which are assumed to be jointly normally distributed with correlation ω. The treatment
(looting regression) and outcome (growth equation) are estimated jointly by maximizing
the bivariate normal likelihood function. This is a fully efficient estimation method which
takes account of the possibility that omitted and unobservable forces determine the realiza-
tions of both growth and looting. This is not a simultaneous equation procedure, so one key
identifying assumption is that contemporaneous growth itself does not determine the Loot
variable.10
8Sachs and Warner (1997) and Mehlum et al. (2006) look at average growth over a 25-year period. We look
at the short-run since our model predicts more immediate impacts on investment and growth.
9Of course irregular departures of the incumbent regime could be due to other factors. We attempt to control
for these other factors with indicators of civil unrest and assume that any other possible determinants are
unrelated to included variables.
10We allow the lagged growth rate of income to enter into the looting equation. We also explore separately a
simultaneous equation model and results are qualitatively similar but require purchase on further identifying
assumptions.
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Table 1 List of countries
Countries Occurrence of looting in the sample
Algeria 1992
Argentina 1976
Bangladesh 1990
Bolivia 1978 1980 1981
Botswana
Burundi 1987
Cameroon 1982
Central African Republic 1981
Chile 1973
China
Congo Brazzaville
Ecuador 1972 1976
Egypt 1981
El Salvador 1979 1980
Ghana 1972 1978 1981
Guatemala 1982 1983
Honduras 1972 1975 1978
Indonesia 1998
Iran 1979
Jordan
Kenya
Malaysia
Mauritania
Mexico 1994
Mozambique
Nicaragua 1979
Niger 1974 1996 1999
Pakistan 1977 1999
Peru 1975
Philippines
Rwanda 1973
Senegal
Sierra Leone 1992
Sri Lanka
Sudan 1985 1989
Syria
Thailand 1973 1991
Togo
Tunisia 1987
Turkey 1980
Uganda
Zaire 1997
Zambia
Zimbabwe
We proxy looting with a binary variable that takes the value one if there is an irregular political change
in regime
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Loot is a binary variable that takes on the value 0 or 1. It is equal to 1 when the la-
tent variable Loot∗ is positive which proxies for a scenario when the net benefit of staying
V (k, d) is negative and departure is optimal. We set Loot equal to 1 when there is an ir-
regular regime change, meaning a ruler or regime has been deposed or forced from power
in a non-constitutional manner.11
Throughout we restrict attention only to those states classified as autocracies by Cheibub
and Gandhi (2004). The regime change data come from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).
Complementary data is available from Archigos, a database of political leaders developed
by Goemans et al. (2009). Archigos is particularly comprehensive and detailed so that we
relied on it whenever there was a discrepancy with Bueno de Mesquita et al.
The key determinants of Loot are resource stocks and foreign lending. The resource
stock comes from Hamilton and Ruta (World Bank, Environment Department). Lending
(i.e., disbursements) by private creditors comes from the World Bank Global Development
Finance (World Bank 2006a).12 The interaction between these two variables is particularly
important. If a positive coefficient is found here, and the marginal impact of lending turns
out to be positive at a given level of resource abundance, this would substantiate the looting
hypothesis.
We impose a number of other exclusion restrictions to improve identification. In partic-
ular we assume that the length of tenure in years of the current regime, fraction of people
speaking a European language at birth introduced by Hall and Jones (1999), the number of
violent demonstrations and clashes (Banks 2001), the existence of an active guerrilla force
(Banks 2001), and the number of peaceful demonstrations of 100 or more people in protest
of the regime (Banks 2001) all help determine whether looting is in fact present in the ob-
served irregular regime change. We also assume that these variables affect growth only via
the impact on political instability. The prior is that such variables are related to some mea-
sure of repression or the intensity of the battles for political power and hence shorten the
time horizons of the government by raising the probability of being deposed in any period
which is related to the variables ρ(k′, s) and cost(s) from our theoretical model. Also in
the vector W1, we include lagged economic growth and regional dummies for Sub-Saharan
Africa, Middle East/North Africa and Latin America.13
Following the empirical growth literature (Barro and Sala-ì-Martin 1995), the growth
equation incorporates lagged growth of GDP per capita, a proxy for human capital accu-
mulation (number of years of schooling), population growth, investment as a percentage of
GDP, the inflation rate, and trade openness. In addition to these variables, vector X1 includes
regional dummies (country dummies in a robustness check), and year indicators. To test for
Dutch Disease, we include in the growth regression the level of resource rents relative to
GDP provided by Hamilton and Ruta. This variable covers mineral, coal, oil and gas rents,
11We are assuming that the political instability induced through looting-type behavior is manifested in terms
of enhanced levels of unscheduled departures. We control for other potential sources of such observed ir-
regular regime change (see below). In our baseline sample (results are reported in Table 3) there are 44
country-year observations out of 752 when Loot equals 1.
12The main limitation of this dataset is that the major Gulf countries are not available because they do not
report such borrowing.
13We also include the square of lagged per capita GDP and resource stock to control for the non-monotonic re-
lationship between these variables and the likelihood of looting, which we have shown formally in the longer
working paper version (Sarr et al. 2010). This longer version is available upon request from the corresponding
author or can be downloaded from the following website: www.commerce.uct.ac.za/Economics/Staff/msarr.
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and is measured as the product of the quantity of resources extracted and the difference
between the resource price and the unit cost of extraction.14
To test Claim 2 the standard growth equation is augmented with our Loot indicator. We
are interested in the indirect effect of lending and resources on growth due to political insta-
bility, that is:
∂E( log(GDPcap)it |Loot(Lendingit ,NRStockit ) = 1)
∂Lendingit
= α1 ∂ Pr(Loot = 1|Lendingit ,NRStockit )
∂Lendingit
(10)
5 Estimation results
This section reports our estimation results. Our baseline specifications are reported in
columns (1) and (2) of Table 3. Panel A represents the growth equation (8) and Panel B
presents the results from our equation for looting (9). In column (2) of the growth equation,
we control for country fixed effects.15
Claim 1 suggests that more foreign lending for a given level of resource wealth raises
the likelihood of looting. The marginal impact of lending is also amplified at higher levels
of resource wealth. The treatment equation shows that the marginal effect of lending for a
given level of resource wealth is given by
∂ Pr(Loot = 1|Lendingit ,NRStockit ,W1it )
∂Lendingit
= (β2 + β3NRStockit )φ(Witβ) (11)
where φ is the standard normal density function.
If this effect is positive and statistically distinguishable from zero, then Claim 1 is sub-
stantiated. Indeed, we find that the marginal impact of lending is positive and hence associ-
ated with a greater likelihood of turnover at sufficiently high levels of resources. This effect
is statistically significant at better than the 1% level for ratios of natural resource wealth to
GDP of greater than 315% (just above the 88th percentile) in the sample.16 The impact is
given as
∂ Pr(Loot = 1|Lendingit ,NRStockit )
∂Lendingit
= (−0.121 + 0.0006 × NRStockit )φ(Witβ) (12)
14We can alternatively include stocks in the growth equation instead of the flow value of resources. The results
are not changed. The reason we use the flow in this case is to correspond with the theoretical predictions that
resource intensity in current production is what matters for Dutch Disease.
15The treatment equation (probit for Loot) controls only for regional dummies. Country fixed effects produce
inconsistent estimates in a standard probit model due to the incidental parameters problem. Conditional logit
is an alternative but comes at the cost of dropping all countries with no looting or 285 country-year observa-
tions in this case. We ran such a model, and the results on the marginal impact of lending were qualitatively
similar to the probit results discussed below.
16The impact is significant at the 10% level at resource wealth above 260% (84th percentile). To determine
the partial effect of lending, the variables included in vector Wit are calculated at their sample means as
a baseline (see Fig. 5). We also ascertain how the effect changes when key variables such as past growth,
per capita GDP and the number of riots and anti-government demonstrations are similar to Nigeria’s (see
Table 4).
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Table 3 Growth and political instability regressions—looting
Without country fixed effects With country fixed effects
(1) (2)
Panel A: Growth equation
Dependent variable: Real per capita GDP growth
Loot −8.790c (2.602) −7.899b (3.466)
Lag resource rent (% GDP) −0.0629 (0.0483) −0.0328 (0.0410)
Lag per capita GDP growth 0.0940b (0.0463) 0.00908 (0.0438)
Population growth 0.0459 (0.203) 0.113 (0.179)
Average years of schooling −0.0977 (0.230) 0.0486 (0.496)
Inflation −0.000297c (0.0000924) −0.000229b (0.000111)
Investment (% GDP) 0.0352 (0.0602) 0.126 (0.125)
Trade (% GDP) 0.00452 (0.0107) −0.0373 (0.0251)
Sub-Saharan Africa −4.032c (1.146)
Middle East and North Africa −2.213b (0.859)
Latin America −2.029a (1.062)
Constant 6.740c (2.274) 3.634 (3.696)
Panel B: Instability equation
Dependent variable: Leaders’ looting
Resource stock (% GDP) −0.00521b (0.00211) −0.00294 (0.00208)
Private lending (% GDP) −0.121c (0.0469) −0.125b (0.0505)
Resource stock×lending 0.000639c (0.000176) 0.000626c (0.000177)
Resource stock2 0.000000687 (0.00000603) −0.00000347 (0.00000652)
Private debt (% GNI) 0.00174 (0.00713) −0.00122 (0.00796)
Lag per capita GDP growth −0.00859 (0.0105) −0.0136 (0.00954)
Lag real per capita GDP −6.395c (1.756) −4.322b (1.878)
Lag real per capita GDP2 0.392c (0.114) 0.257b (0.121)
Tenure 0.00180 (0.00904) −0.00690 (0.00899)
Native European language (%) −1.604c (0.574) −1.654b (0.725)
Riots 0.119b (0.0595) 0.119b (0.0602)
Guerrilla warfare 0.186a (0.107) 0.108 (0.126)
Anti-government demonstrations 0.0464 (0.0404) 0.0503 (0.0450)
Sub-Saharan Africa −0.866b (0.342) −0.732b (0.346)
Middle East and North Africa 0.172 (0.420) 0.217 (0.393)
Latin America 2.032c (0.500) 2.108c (0.594)
Constant 24.65c (6.811) 16.75b (7.371)
Correlation ω 0.741c (0.149) 0.675b (0.222)
Variance σ 6.353c (0.397) 5.966c (0.363)
Observations 752 752
Number of countries 44 44
Log pseudo-likelihood −2544.0 −2505.9
Wald test of indep. eq. Chi2(1) 8.342 4.038
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ap < 0.1, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.01
Dependent variables: GDP growth in Panel A (outcome equation) and looting in Panel B (treatment equation).
Control for time dummies. The probit equation controls only for regional dummies. Country fixed effects
produce inconsistent estimates in a standard probit model due to the incidental parameters problem
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Table 4 Effect of lending on growth
Effect of lending on growth Growth Growth
(1) (2)
Coefficient loot −8.790c −7.899b
Pr(loot=1 | Mean lending, other controls) 0.069 0.068
Pr(loot=1 | Mean lending+std dev, other controls) 0.151 0.128
Increase in probability of loot 0.082c 0.06c
Total −0.72 −0.47
Column (1) shows the effect without country fixed effects; column (2) with country fixed effects
The variables are set at their mean level (average country) except for resource levels, growth, log GDP per
capita, and the number of riots and demonstrations which are set as in Nigeria in the year 1998 (at the end of
Abacha’s dictatorship). We test whether the partial effect of lending on the probability of looting is different
from 0. ap < 0.1, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.01
This result indicates that greater lending to sufficiently resource-rich countries is associated
with enhanced likelihood of looting (see Fig. 5). Table 4 also shows a rise in the predicted
probability of looting from 0.07 to 0.15 when lending rises by one standard deviation from
the mean and other control variables are as in Nigeria in 1998. In many of our sample
countries just prior to looting events we see equivalent rises in foreign lending. Both of
these results indicate that greater lending in resource-rich countries is associated with greater
political instability. Twelve of the 44 countries in our sample had resource wealth large
enough to make the overall marginal effect above positive and statistically significant.
Claim 2 is that looting is detrimental to growth. The outcome (growth) model supports
this claim as well—see columns (1) and (2) in Panel A. The effect of our looting indicator on
growth is negative and it is statistically significant. The point estimate suggests that output
per capita drops by nearly 9% in the event of an irregular political turnover.17
In investigating the effect of looting on growth, we are largely interested in the indirect
effect of foreign lending on growth which fuels looting in resource rich countries. This
indirect effect is the product of the coefficient of instability in the growth equation (α1)
with the marginal effect of lending on the probability of looting. For expositional purposes,
we choose to vary lending (L) relative to GDP by one standard deviation from its mean
(respectively L = 2.78 and L+StdDev = 6.1). The value of the resource ratios, past growth,
per capita GDP and the number of riots and anti-government demonstrations are those of
Nigeria in the year 1998—at the end of Sani Abacha’s dictatorship.18 All other variables in
the treatment equations were set at their mean levels. Equation (10) is then re-written as:
E( log(GDPcap)it |L + WStdDev) − E( log(GDPcap)it |L)
= α1
{
Pr(Loot = 1|L + StdDev) − Pr(Loot = 1|L)}
17Adding five further lags of the looting indicator to the growth equation suggests another loss of 4% of
output after two years. There is also no sign of significantly faster growth even up to five years after the
irregular political change. This is suggestive of our model’s prediction that once looting has occurred little
further investment in the economy is worthwhile.
18Nigeria is not actually in our sample due to missing data on schooling rates. The resource stock to GDP
ratio averaged 645 (in percentage terms) between 1970 and 1999.
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Fig. 5 Marginal effect of lending on looting.
The full line represents the marginal effect of lending on the probability of looting as the resource stock
increases from 0 to 800% of GDP. The dotted lines represent the confidence interval at 5% level. These
graphs relate to the baseline regressions performed in Table 3. The first one depicts the marginal effect of
lending on looting in the absence of country fixed effects, while the second one depicts the marginal effect in
the presence of country fixed effects
We find in Table 4 that the effect of one standard deviation increase in lending results in an
expected decrease in economic growth of 0.72 and 0.47 percentage points for specifications
(1) and (2). Together these findings provide strong evidence to support our Claims 1 and 2
and our theoretical model. Lending to resource-rich dictators raises the chance of political
instability, leading to low growth.
We also include debt in the looting equation. Our modeling of the dictator would indicate
that in general debt would be positively related to looting. Our empirical results are not so
clear-cut. The coefficient in the probit equation is positive, but it is not statistically signif-
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icant. The lack of a clear finding here could be because the debt to GDP ratio is a noisy
measure of the debt burden. Alternatively, this weak finding could be the result of the fact
that our model looks at a single dictator’s choices across time, while the dataset encom-
passes a heterogeneous group of states. The relationship between debt and looting becomes
more complicated as any given state approaches its aggregate debt constraint. When the debt
constraint is slack banks are willing to provide loans, making looting more likely. However,
when the constraint becomes tighter, increased indebtedness impacts upon the availability
of lending as the supply of credit is rationed. This reduces the scope for obtaining new loans
and therefore may render looting less attractive.
The ratio of resource rents to GDP is included in the growth regression as a test of the
Dutch Disease hypothesis. We find that the impact on annual growth is negative but it is
significant only at the 20% level. This suggests that the claims generated by our model of
looting may provide an alternative, or at least complementary channel to the Dutch Dis-
ease channel. It also expands on Mehlum et al. (2006) who found evidence consistent with
Dutch Disease when institutional quality was poor.19 We find that even in weak institutional
environments foreign lending may be necessary to lead to slow growth.
Regarding the effects of the other control variables on growth we find mixed results. In-
flation is negatively associated with growth (p-value = 0.001). The lagged growth rate is
positively associated with this year’s growth rate (p-value = 0.042). Investment is positively
associated with annual growth rates (p-value = 0.558). Schooling is negatively associated
with growth (again, not statistically significant). Trade openness is positively associated
with growth (p-value = 0.672).20 Overall, our model uses relatively high frequency (an-
nual) data. Using lower frequency data puts our growth regression results more in line with
standard empirical growth regressions, but we lose the ability to gauge the immediate impact
of looting on the economy.
Further results from the probit equation suggest that riots, guerrilla activity and anti-
government demonstrations are positively associated with turnover. These variables are out-
comes determining the probability of losing power via repression and consumption sharing.
In the theory we model this outcome as a function of the capital stock (or incomes) and the
investment in security services. Further work could be done to parameterize this auxiliary
equation but it is only of indirect interest to us.
Also, other theories suggest that resources generate civil conflict as interest groups com-
pete to secure rents (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Caselli 2006). Despite controlling for these
conflicts, we find that foreign lending, on the back of resource collateral, impacts on our
measure of looting. That is to say, these controls still leave room for the looting hypothesis.
The length of tenure is statistically insignificant, while the fraction of population speaking a
European language is negatively associated with looting.
19Both Mehlum et al. (2006), and Corden and Neary (1982) used the value of resource exports relative to
GDP as a proxy for resource dependence. They also study average growth over longer horizons than our
paper which focuses on short-run output losses. In the original theories of resource dependence (e.g., Corden
and Neary), economic dependence on resources is measured as the share of total production accounted for
by resource-based activity. Using the export ratio in our growth regression instead reduces the point estimate
on the looting variable to −3.2, and it is no longer significant. Still, in the treatment regression, lending is
positively and significantly associated with the probability of looting as before. Finding out why resource
exports relative to GDP, but not the ratio of total resource rents to GDP, eliminates the statistical significance
of looting on growth is an avenue for further exploration.
20Evidence on the relationship between trade and growth is generally mixed (cf. Yanikaya 2003; and Edwards
1998). According to Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), the only systematic relationship is “that countries reduce
their trade barriers as they get richer”.
374 Public Choice (2011) 148:353–380
Finally, a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the error term of the looting equation
is uncorrelated with the error term of the growth equation. For example, in our baseline
specifications, we obtain a test statistic for the null hypothesis that the correlation is zero
of χ2(1) = 8.34 (p-value = 0.0039) without fixed effects in column (1) and χ2(1) = 4.04
(p-value = 0.045) with fixed effects in column (2). This implies that the joint estimation of
the treatment and outcome equations is required to generate unbiased estimates of the other
parameters. We also note that the correlation between the errors is estimated to be positive.
Unobserved factors positively affecting turnover are also associated with periods of higher
growth. This could be the case if the unobservables driving turnover clear the way for better
growth.
We now discuss the robustness of our findings to possible endogeneity. It could be argued
that our main explanatory variables—lending and resource wealth—may be endogenous and
associated with omitted factors that determine looting.
Development and exploitation of natural resources might be pursued where industrial
potential (and hence growth potential) is limited for institutional or other social and political
reasons. This could also lead to short time horizons for leaders leading to malfeasance,
popular discontent and a greater chance of political turnover. If true, this would tend to
overstate the impact of resources in our probit model since countries already at risk for
looting and slow growth for other reasons simply become reliant on resources by default.
The impact of loans might also be biased, but in this case the bias is likely to be down-
wards. If banks and companies that invest in countries do so only in the least risky environ-
ments, where political turnover is most unlikely, then the marginal impact of capital inflows
on looting and growth could be biased downward.21
Since both international lending and commodity prices are often determined by forces
external to developing economies, a set of instrumental variables based on these forces is
available. Demand conditions in the principal industrialized countries strongly drive com-
modity prices (Pindyck and Rotemberg 1990). These prices are key components of measured
resource rents and stocks. Similarly, international capital flows to the developing world tend
to surge when G-7 interest rates are low (see Calvo et al. 1993, 1994). On the other hand,
it would be hard to argue that industrial policies and macroeconomic conditions are related
to country-level unobservables that drive variance in our looting variable. These are mainly
determined by forces unrelated to the foreign business cycle given the relative magnitudes
of economic output and the structure of aggregate global supply and demand.22
The fact that external forces drive resource wealth and lending make commodity prices
and interest rates plausible instruments since they seem to be highly correlated with our
potentially endogenous variables and there is little reason to expect that they would affect
political instability except via their impact on resource dependence and lending as per the
model presented above. Our excluded instruments include global price indexes for 12 key
commodities, the yield on three-year US Treasury bonds and the interaction between each
price index and the bond yield.23
21Despite this we still find a positive impact of lending which qualitatively supports our main prediction from
our model. If this bias dominated, the impact could in fact be larger than we have found.
22If these external forces affect countries in different ways, or if lending rises more quickly in particular
types of countries that are systematically less likely to experience looting there may still be some remaining
endogeneity bias. However, much of the variance is inter-temporal rather than in cross-sectional. This raises
the plausibility of the identification strategy since it compares the impact of these forces for the same set of
countries over time.
23The commodities include petroleum, natural gas, bauxite, copper, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, gold, zinc,
silver and iron.
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Table 5 Second stage Instrumental Variables—Probit for loot equation
Loot with residuals Loot without residuals
(1) (2)
Resource stock (% GDP) 0.00182 (0.00659) −0.00225 (0.00223)
Private lending (% GDP) 0.127 (0.199) −0.101b (0.0482)
Resource stock×lending −0.000592 (0.00136) 0.000589c (0.000147)
Resource stock2 −0.00000398 (0.00000710) −0.00000324 (0.00000573)
Private debt (% GNI) −0.00408 (0.0120) −0.00709 (0.00671)
Lag per capita GDP growth −0.0137 (0.00995) −0.0152 (0.00938)
Lag real per capita GDP −6.865 (4.525) −4.333 (2.678)
Lag real per capita GDP2 0.408 (0.291) 0.248 (0.171)
Tenure −0.0188 (0.0176) −0.0111 (0.0125)
Native European language (%) −1.940a (1.177) −1.473a (0.815)
Riots 0.155a (0.0852) 0.110a (0.0639)
Guerrilla warfare 0.155 (0.176) 0.124 (0.145)
Anti-government demonstrations 0.0246 (0.0694) 0.0470 (0.0558)
Sub-Saharan Africa −0.323 (0.457) −0.495 (0.387)
Middle East and North Africa 0.156 (0.802) 0.432 (0.396)
Latin America 2.212c (0.700) 2.087c (0.627)
Residuals resource stock −0.00398 (0.00621)
Residuals lending −0.256 (0.206)
Residuals resource stock 0.00126 (0.00143)
Constant 26.55 (17.02) 17.20 (10.67)
Observations 752 752
Number of countries 44 44
Log pseudo-likelihood −132.0 −133.1
Pseudo R-square 0.185 0.178
F -test first stage—Resource F(25,43) 1.99
F -test first stage—Lending F(25,43) 18.49
F -test first stage—Interaction F(25,43) 2.22
Test all residuals = 0—Chi2(3) 2.32
P -value 0.5083
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ap < 0.1, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.01
The three F -tests test the joint significance of the instrumental variables in each of the first-stage regressions.
The Chi2-test is an endogeneity test of the joint significance of the three residuals
To use these instruments, we report estimation results from a control function approach
for our looting equation. This also enables us to test directly the exogeneity of these variables
in the political instability equation. The method is a two-step procedure. In the first step, we
estimate the residuals of the reduced-form equations for the ratio of resource stocks to GDP,
lending and the interaction of the two on the excluded instruments and the other included
covariates. The second step is the estimation of the looting probit equation with the addition
of the reduced-form residuals as additional explanatory variables. The joint significance of
the coefficients of the residuals in the second stage probit equation will be indicative of
endogeneity (Smith and Blundell 1986).
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For the first stage, we find that the instruments are highly correlated with the (potentially)
endogenous variables (full results available upon request). The set of instruments used for
lending, resources and their interaction is jointly significant in each of the three reduced
form equations.24 Second stage results are reported in Table 5. The residuals are jointly
statistically insignificant (χ2(3) = 2.32, p-value = 0.5083). This finding shows that we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that our key explanatory variables are exogenous.25
We also undertook several other robustness checks in addition to those mentioned above.
Our results are not being driven solely by African experience. We removed all Sub-Saharan
African countries from our sample. This drops the sample size to just 394 country-year
observations. Still our results are qualitatively exactly the same as when these countries are
included.
We explored a simultaneous system for our two estimating equations. We found that our
results regarding the determinants of looting are again qualitatively the same as those found
using the treatment regression specification.
Another robustness check uses an alternative measure of political instability. We use an
indicator of turnover of all the veto players introduced by Beck et al. (2001) and Keefer
(2005).26 The results are available upon request from the corresponding author.27 Our find-
ings for the treatment regression are consistent with our earlier findings using Loot. The
marginal effect of lending at sufficiently high levels of resources is positive. The point es-
timates on the turnover of veto players variable is also negative and statistically significant
in the growth equation. This suggests that subsequent economic outcomes might be similar
after coalition implosion as in the cases examined above.
6 Conclusion
This paper attempts to unravel a mechanism through which the much-discussed resource
curse operates. Our main contribution is to show how credit market imperfections impact
upon the choices of dictators in resource-rich countries, which in turn leads to instability and
slow growth. In our model, a dictator makes a choice between staying and looting. Looting
involves the immediate translation of political control into maximum appropriable gain.
Such looting is facilitated when international banks are willing to turn natural resources into
24F -tests for the excluded instruments are as follows: in the resource stock equation F(25,43) = 1.99, p-
value = 0.0232; the lending equation F(25,43) = 18.49, p-value = 0.0; the interaction between resources
and lending F(25,43) = 2.22, p-value = 0.01.
25We also replaced lending, resources and their interaction with the price index for petroleum, the three-year
US interest rate, and their interaction in the looting probit model. Our results from Claim 1 are once again
confirmed. Interest rates enter with a negative sign, and the interaction term is positive. This implies that a
marginal decline in US interest rates has a direct positive impact. At the average value of the oil price index,
the impact remains positive. Also an instrumental variables linear probability model with fixed effects was
run. A Hausman test cannot reject that OLS is consistent.
26Instead of the turnover of the leader only, this database records the percentage turnover of veto players.
In presidential systems, veto players are defined as the president and the largest party in the legislature, and
in parliamentary systems, the veto players are defined as the PM and the three largest government parties.
There are 35 instances out of 676 country-year observations when such a turnover occurs. Note that in the
DPI, the turnover of all the veto players is almost systematically reported a year after the actual turnover
of leadership—checked with both Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) and the detailed documentation from
Archigos. We have corrected this discrepancy accordingly.
27They can also be downloaded from the following website: www.commerce.uct.ac.za/Economics/Staff/msarr.
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loans. The incentives for staying, on the other hand, result from the opportunity for taking
advantage of the country’s potential productivity while remaining in power.
Our model suggests that the dictator will be fundamentally influenced in this choice
by the level of lending afforded by external banking institutions. The opportunity cost to
staying and investing in the economy increases directly with any increase in the liquidity
being afforded.
Our story is closely related to the literature on “odious debt” (Jayachandran and Kremer
2006). Odious debt may result when lending to autocrats results in little for the country
concerned other than debt. Our story is also related to the literature on efficient contracts
for sovereign lending (Bulow 2002; Kletzer and Wright 2000). We have demonstrated here
that unstructured resource-based lending is the antithesis of efficient sovereign loan con-
tracting, and odious debts are the result. Our point here is that the indebtedness and poor
performance of these resource-rich economies is as much a result of the poor contracting
by the financial sector as it is the unchecked power and poor institutions within the debtor
regimes. It takes negligence or malfeasance by both the parties to make a bad contract.
These bad contracts, together with the weak institutions in the resource-rich nations, create
the environment within which non-investment, instability, and debt are generated—hence
the resource curse.
The importance of restricting short term liquidity to aid the enforceability of loan agree-
ments has been long-noted (Bulow and Rogoff 1989) as has been the tendency of banks to
ignore such advice (Bulow 2002). The problem is argued to be one of moral hazard in the fi-
nancial markets, where banks fail to internalise the risks of default because of the belief that
sovereign debts will ultimately be “worked out” and particularly those with large amounts
of natural resources underlying them.28 The failure of the financial sector to internalize these
risks places these costs upon the peoples of the countries concerned.
We find strong evidence to support our main prediction that unsound lending to dictators
in resource rich countries results in instability, and ultimately in slower economic growth.
Here, resources become a curse when imperfect domestic and international institutions (po-
litical and financial markets) interact to produce political instability, which in turn impedes
economic growth. Poor lending practices is one channel through which the resource curse
operates.
There are many approaches advocated to deal with this sort of moral hazard Bulow
(2002). believes that the problem is traceable, fundamentally, to the intervention of external
institutions in rescuing commercial banks from defaults. Banks engage in moral hazard in
these lending practices on account of a fundamental failure of belief in the possibility of
default. He recommends that banks should be made to execute loan agreements under do-
mestic laws, enforceable only in domestic courts, in order to ensure that the debtor state’s
interests are taken into consideration. It is argued by some that advance due diligence in
lending should be a requirement for the enforceability of the resulting debt (Jayachandran et
al. 2006). One possibility is to require that any loans be more structured obligations, relying
on specified investments rather than general assets. This would ensure that banks required
investments as a result of loans, and that these investments were of a sort that could gen-
erate returns to the bank. Finally, it may be more appropriate to encourage FDI rather than
28Empirical work documents that private holdings of sovereign debt are not harmed by the fact of default. As
Klingen et al. (2004) have demonstrated, “the strategy of rolling over and waiting for a debt restructuring with
official backing seems to have worked well in containing losses and even making profits in some cases. From
the banks’ perspective, the write downs (. . .) were offset by the high prices of the restructured instruments,
i.e., an expectation that the new claims would probably be honored.”
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sovereign debt, again rendering recourse to domestic institutions necessary. All of these ap-
proaches may reduce the availability of debt in general, but our analysis indicates that this
may be a good thing.
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